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Introduction
According to [Blinder et al., 2008] , before the 1990s, there was a consensus among the monetary authorities "to speak as little as possible and in a codi…ed way". Today, in addition to their own websites, central banks use media, blogs, social medias and live broadcasts to communicate with the general public. [Fry et al., 2000] gives a brief summary of the central bank's communication path towards transparency. From 1945 to 1970, two types of economic structure operated in the world. In the …rst, on the Bretton Woods regime, countries maintained a …xed exchange rate in relation to the American currency, which limited the scope of monetary policy. In the second typical structure, countries used capital controls policies to isolate their economies from the prices of the rest of the world. The consequences of the controls led to …scal pressure, with an increase in in ‡ation and consequent depreciation of the currency. In this 1 case, the central bank operated as a sort of government collector through the in ‡ationary tax.
After the collapse of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, there was no clear pattern of monetary policy action for the next 10 years. From the 1980s onwards, the view grew that economic growth only occurred with price stability, and that this could only be achieved by better designing the role of monetary policy.
In the 1990s, developed countries began to set in ‡ation targets, which should be pursued by relatively independent central banks. In the following decade, in ‡ation targeting policies were also adopted by several emerging countries.
In ‡ation targets are only possible if the monetary authority communicates not only its value, but also the means it intends to use to achieve it. In his speech of transmission of role 1 , held on June 13, 2016, the president of the Central Bank of Brazil (Bacen), Ilan Goldfajn, stated that: "An essential element of monetary policy, and of the in ‡ation targeting regime in particular, is the continuous communication with society through the formal channels of the Central Bank. This communication needs to be simple, direct and concise in order to best convey the Central Bank's view, including the uncertainties regarding the perspective of di¤erent trajectories for the economic scenario. The Central Bank's communication also needs to make clear the necessary conditions for the perspectives presented."
In this line, [Bernanke et al., 2007] argues that the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy transmission channels increases if people have a full understanding of the objectives and strategies of monetary policy.
This means that central banks should be more transparent in their decisions and rely on various means of communication for this.
However, despite the consensus that transparency is important for monetary policy, there are doubts about the degree of transparency that the central bank should adopt. [Morris and Shin, 2007] raise the hypothesis that much information may even a¤ect the understanding of monetary policy. [Sims et al., 2010] argue that …nancial market participants are alert to every change in the language of monetary policy, but the average individual does not incorporate this information at the same speed.
Many of the information disclosed by the monetary authority have a technical touch. [Blinder et al., 2008] criticize this form of communication directed to these …nancial market participants, and point out that greater attention is needed in communication with the general public. One way to accomplish this is with media interviews.
On media and communication of central banks, [Hayo and Neuenkirch, 2015 ] studied through a questionnaire with 195 participants how …nancial market agents process information from the four largest central banks in the world 2 . The results of this research pointed out that the participants rely more on media reports than they do their own monitoring, with the exception of announcements of interest decisions in their own country. They also …nd evi-dence that the greater the reliability in the media, the lower the degree of selfmonitoring and the greater the probability of using this media, especially for asset managers. On the other hand traders increase the degree of self-monitoring given the importance of the central bank event.
For the understanding of the general public, news releases in the media are important because they carry out a process of "translating" technical terms into a more accessible language. However, in this process, much information can be lost or misinterpreted and / or written, a consequence of the behavioral component present in news.
In the case of central bank communication and behavioral …nance, the heuristic bias of representativeness draws attention.
Representation occurs when agents use informal rules of judgment. In general, members of monetary policy committees are classi…ed by economic agents as hawk or dove against in ‡ation. Some studies use quantitative measures to perform this classi…cation.
Using a Bayesian approach to the Bank of England's monetary policy committee's voting history, they …nd evidence that there is heterogeneity among voting members with individuals who have made a career in the private sector with bias hawk [Sibert, 2003 ] constructs a theoretical model of reputation building, in which the central banker, knowing that he has his reputation at stake, changes his decision optimally to be classi…ed as hawk.
With behavioral arguments, [Malmendier et al., 2016] show that the votes and in ‡ation expectations of members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Fed are a¤ected by the in ‡ation they themselves experienced in their personal life, given their time of life.
However, many of these classi…cations are made ad hoc, according to past decisions and speeches and even academic and professional background. In this way, biases can arise in the pricing of assets. A speech from a dove member will only be relevant to the market if it sounds hawk, for example.
Unlike papers such as [Ericsson, 2016] , [Stekler and Symington, 2016] , [Chague et al., 2015] and [Cabral and Guimaraes, 2015] , the latter two for Brazil, which analyze the texts in technical reports of the central banks, such as communiqués, minutes and forecasts, the analysis carried out in this article focuses on the communication of Bacen in the specialized media.
[ Carvalho et al., 2013] test the repercussion of the o¢ cial communication of Bacen in the specialized media. Based on Copom's interest decision releases, the authors withdrew citations classi…ed as hawk or dove and seek to pass these snippets on the media using as a measure the number of results returned by the Google search tool. They point out that short-and medium-term interests are impacted by the information content of the communiqués, but only for periods prior to the presidency of Alexandre Tombini.
In this article will be used the unpublished news archives of Broadcast, Agência Estado, to identify the days in which the president or any director of Bacen was quoted in the specialized media. The 2 section provides more details about these archives.
It has been found evidence that the volatility of short interest rates is higher in these days, especially when considering more recent periods. The name of the president of the Bank is more relevant for the pricing of interest than names of directors of areas of the bank, such as the directors of monetary policy or economic policy. The other publications, technical studies and speeches published on the institution's website (excluding communiqués and minutes of decisions) also lead to an increase in interest volatility, especially in longer periods.
As the news archive has intraday frequency, with three publications throughout the day, it was tested whether there is an increase in volatility if the name of the president of Bacen appeared only in the publication of the end of the day (which would indicate that the information was disclosed during the trading session), but it was not possible to …nd traces of increased volatility in this analysis.
This article is organized as follows: In the section 2 there is a brief description of the news archives to be used in the section 3. the evolution of the Central Bank's communication. The variables that identify the days in which the hypothesis of greater volatility is tested are in the section: 4, as well as the description of the interest vertices, the intraday interest calculation and the controls. The section 5 brie ‡y outlines the GARCH family model that will be used in the tests. After the results in the section 6, the last section presents the conclusions.
News Archive -Broadcast
With more than 12 thousand users, Agência Estado's AE Broadcast platform represents Brazil's largest real-time online …nancial information distribution platform.
Its users consist of agents of the …nancial market, such as banks, brokers, investment funds and consulting, that is, agents that are among the main price makers of Brazilian assets.
Among its various products, AE News stands out, which, in addition to covering in real time and providing the main events relevant to the world …nan-cial market, presents three daily news summaries with the main facts that have driven the market.
Always for business days in Brazil, the "Opening" summary is disclosed before 8 am, i.e. before the beginning of the Brazilian trading session. In it, the news that were highlights over the previous night and in the markets already in operation on the day are listed. The summary "Scenario 1", released at approximately 1 pm, is complemented by the news that occurred in the period. After 6 pm, with the trading session closed, "Scenario 2" is published, with a complete summary of the news that in ‡uenced the economy in Brazil and in the world.
Starting in February 2005 and ending in April 2016, the database contains articles for 2,753 days, totaling, therefore, 8,259 articles.
Opening ("Op" for now on), Scenario 1 ("C1") and Scenario 2 ("C2") are periodic summaries, that is, they do not provide new information. The release of unpublished news is made in the form of headlines, among the disclosures of the abstracts. Therefore, the present work does not seek to analyze whether Broadcast functions as a platform for the study of events, but rather can provide information about the feelings of price makers during three periods of the day. Two facts mentioned above (target public specialized in the prices makers and three intraday summaries) present di¤erentials in relation to other studies that seek to capture the variation of the sentiment of the economic agents through news.
The fact that the news is targeted to the target audience mitigates the problem of rational inattention. [Sims, 2003] assumes that people have limited attention, and allocate them optimally. There is, therefore, a di¤erence in the speed of reaction to economic news between specialized and non-specialized agents. Because specialized agents are price-makers, the impact of Broadcast news on prices is faster.
On frequency, while Broadcast provides smaller and relatively regular time information (5 hours between Op and C1 or C1 and C2 and 10 hours between Op and C2), which allows to evaluate the price variation of assets only during the trading section, the works of [Matthies and Liu, 2014] and [Manela and Moreira, 2017] use only one set of news per day, in these cases the covers of The Wall Street Journal.
Communication from the Central Bank
The Collegiate Board of Central Bank of Brazil, the highest decision-making body responsible for formulating policies and directives necessary for the exercise of the competencies of the Central Bank, is composed by eight boards, in addition to the institution's chairmanship. That is, the o¢ cial communication procedure does not occur via the media. There is at most only supplementary information in interviews.
However, a second point in the communique calls attention to: "Communication privileges the message as a whole and not the use of keywords to convey their ratings or signalize future actions. O¢ cial documents should be analyzed as a whole".
Using communiqués released up to December 2013, [Cabral and Guimaraes, 2015] compared the size and the informational volume of the Bacen communiqué with that of 11 other central banks. They conclude that the Brazilian communiqué is the smallest in the sample and, unlike the others, did not disclose risk scenarios and balance sheets immediately after the decision.
The pattern continued until June 2016. The small changes in the communiques came from the inclusion, exclusion or exchange of a few words (like the word "parsimony", for example). However, since the 200th meeting, under the new chairman of the institution, Ilan Goldfajn, the pattern has moved towards the international central banks. The text no longer follows a particular pattern and incorporated the scenarios and risks inherent in them.
Thus, it can be understood that the press release disclosed signals a change of guidelines in the Central Bank of Brazil´s communication. That is, before the change, the interviews and comments "o¤ the record" in the media had a relevant role in the conduct of the monetary policy, fact that no longer occurs. This paper attempts to capture this possible in ‡uence of the Central Bank of Brazil's communication through the media in asset prices.
Before starting to analyze the data, it is worth commenting on another change in the Central Bank of Brazil's communication towards greater transparency with the general public. In May 2012, at its 167th meeting, the Copom began to disclose how each of its members voted, something that is not shared by all central banks ( [Cabral and Guimaraes, 2015] ). This change provides more information on the biases of each voting member of the Copom, helping the market in the dove / hawk classi…cation quoted above.
Variables
In this article, no distinction was made on the topic covered in the Broadcast news. It searched in the database of more than eight thousand news only the name of the president and directors of the institution. A dummy was then created that assumes 1 on the day the name was quoted. The news can then refer to an unpublished interview, a speech made days before or even the agenda of the monetary authority.
The 
Variables of Interest
Fourteen dummies were taken from the news database. Four of these dummies are retrieved if the name of the President of Central Bank of Brazil appears in the Op, C1, C2 summaries or at least one of them (that is, if the name appeared on the day). Four other dummies will be related to the names of the directors of Direx, Dipec, Dipom or Dinor (which appear most frequently in the database) on the day.
The other six dummies come from the other means of communication of Central Bank of Brazil, the publications and technical notes published on its own website. In addition to a dummy for days in which there were publications, whether signed or not by a president or director, dummies were built for studies signed by the President and the four Directors mentioned above.
The table 2 shows how often these names appear on the media or subscribe to Central Bank of Brazil publications in the 2; 753 days of the sample (February 2005 through April 2016). It is observed that the President is the member of the Copom with more quotations in the period (in 42% of the days there are quotes to his name), followed by the Director of Dipec, the Director of Direx, Dipom and Dinor. The distribution of the name of the President among the three abstracts (Op, C1 and C2) is slightly larger in the summary Opening.
< TABLE 2 -HERE>
There is some publication on the Bacen website on 15% of the days of the sample. The President is the member with the most publications signed, with 47% of the total. As well as the frequency of appearances in the media, the second place is the Director of Dipec, followed by the Director of Direx. The number of publications by the Director of Dinor is greater than the number of the Director of Dipom, contrary to what happens in the media.
By setting the date of interest decision by the Copom at t = 0, graphs of frequency of occurrences in the media were constructed from this date. As the Copom meetings are held every 40 days from 2006, and no more every 30 days, the charts start on this date. For year-end comparisons, the year 2016 was excluded. Figure 1 shows that the President's appearances are distributed evenly over time. The Directors of Direx, Dipom and Dinor do not have a clear pattern of appearances. In addition, in both, no changes in frequencies have been observed over the years < FIGURE 1 -HERE> However, for Dipec, it is possible to observe an increase of citations of its director between 15 and 25 days after the decision. There seems to be a "quiet period" for his director until two weeks after the interest decision. In addition, appearances between days 5 and 15 after the decisions are more frequent in the years 2013, 2014 and 2015, which would signal that the director anticipated his appearance in the media in recent periods.
The …gure 2 keeps the zero mark on the last day of the Copom meeting, but now it is analyzed on which days the probability of the Bacen site is higher to release a report. Publications signed by members or non-members of the Copom occur mostly 15 days after the decision of interest. Signed by the President take place mostly between 8 and 18.
< FIGURE 2 -HERE> For the Director of Economic Policy (Dipec), the pattern is similar to the appearances of his name in the media, with a concentration between 14 and 25. This may mean that the media is only mentioning the studies and speeches of the director disclosed in the site of the Bacen, and that the news channel does not bring information to the market other than those already provided by the institution's website.
Explanatory variables and controls
As explanatory variables for the study of daily interest volatility, nine vertices 5 of the Pre-DI Swap, calculated by BM&FBovespa. The use of several 5 30, 60, 90, 120, 180, 360, 540, 720 and 900 days. 8 vertices seeks to capture if the communication has di¤erent e¤ects along the Brazilian term structure of interest rate.
As there is no calculation of the swap throughout the day, it was necessary to construct interest series at three periods of the day in intraday regressions. The BM&FBovespa website provides, tick-by-tick, the values of the DI futures contracts. Interest rates were selected at the opening, at the closing and the closest to the 13 hours, approximate time of the disclosure of the summary Scenario 1.
With vertex prices, these were interpolated by the Spline method. In this way, it is possible to observe, at each intraday period, the theoretical interest rate for the cited vertices, keeping the duration constant. The data go from May 2014 to July 2015, totaling 927 observations (three per day).
The graphs of the daily series of the nine vertices are found in Figure 3 , while the 360-day intraday interest series and the 360-Day Pre-DI Swap calculated by the BM&FBovespa are in Figure 4 < FIGURE 3 -HERE> < FIGURE 4 -HERE> As control variables, dummies were used for the day following Copom's interest decision, since the market is closed at the time of disclosure and the adjustment occurs on the following day, and on the day of the Copom Minutes 6 , which can provide more details on the discussion at the meeting.
Two macroeconomic variables were added as controls. On days of in ‡ation and industrial production (IPCA and seasonally adjusted monthly variation of the industrial production of the Monthly Industrial Survey, both of IBGE), there are changes in interest rates in the event of a surprise in the face of market expectations. To capture this possible surprise, an index was constructed as follows.
In research with members of the …nancial market, Bloomberg captures market expectations for certain indicators. There is, therefore, a distribution of expected values for the number. The median of this distribution is then deviated from the value actually reported. This di¤erence is divided by the standard deviation of the projection distribution. Finally, this index is normalized.
In short, if there is a surprise in in ‡ation or industrial production, but the distribution of expectations is dispersed, the surprise is minimized. But if the standard deviation is small, the surprise is considered high, which is re ‡ected in interest.
Methodology
The model used to estimate interest volatility was the traditional EGARCH (1,1), by [Nelson, 1991] , which allows asymmetry in volatility. The distribution 6 Another change in the Bacen communication introduced by the Executive Board headed by Ilan Goldfajn was the anticipation of the release of the Copom Minutes for Tuesday of the following week, against Thursday previously. used was t-Student. The models GARCH (1,1) of [Bollerslev, 1986] and the GJR(1,1) of [Glosten et al., 1993] were tested, as well as the Gaussian distribution instead of the Student-t, but the …rst speci…cation presented the best information criterion. Models with higher orders were not tested.
In the chosen model, four dummies were included, besides the two series of macroeconomic surprise. In both the mean and the variance equations, one of the 14 variables of interest was included. As controls in the mean equation, surprises were added in the IPCA and industrial production. Finally, the dummies for the day after the decision of interest by Copom and the day of disclosure of the Minutes are included in the variance equation.
Therefore, the speci…cation of the EGARCH (1,1) obeyed the following criterion:
where r t is the interest rate variation, 2 t is the conditional variance of interest, D V arInt;t is the dummy of the variable of interest, S IP CA;t is the surprise of the IPCA, S P IM;t is the surprise of industrial production, D Copom;t is the dummy for the day after the Copom meeting and D Ata;t is the dummy for the Copom Minutes disclosure day. As stated above, t follows a t-Student distribution.
The OxMetrics software was used for estimating the coe¢ cients, using the optimization algorithm MaxSA.
Results
With the methodology above, three groups of results were obtained. In the subsection 6.1, all 2; 753 days of the sample were included in the regression.
In the subsection 6.2, a rolling regression was performed, with a window of 1; 000 days, to analyze the evolution of the parameters of interest for both the mean and variance equations. In this analysis, only the interest of the vertex of 360 days, the most liquid, will be analyzed.
In the subsection 6.3 the results obtained for intraday volatility of the 360-day interest proxy are presented.
Daily Regressions
Comparing the value assumed by the coe¢ cients of the controls in the 14 regressions, there was no great variability between them. Thus, we begin this subsection by analyzing the results of the controls and then compare the results obtained with the 14 variables of interest.
The table 3 summarizes 9 regressions arranged in columns, with 9 di¤erent interest vertices, contemplating short interest, from 30 days to long interest of 900 days.
As a variable of interest, we chose whether there was a quotation to the President of the Central Bank on the day.
As mentioned above, this particular variable will not be studied in the 3, but rather in the 4 and 5
< TABLE 3 -HERE>
The controls included in the mean equation are positive and signi…cant. When in ‡ation or industrial output is higher than expected, there is an increase in interest rates on the days of disclosure of the indicators. The surprise of the IPCA a¤ects the entire term structure of interest rate, mainly interest over 540 days. Surprises in industrial production do not lead to interest increases in the short term, but a¤ect pricing in longer periods, with a greater impact on interest of 540 days.
In the variance equation, as one would expect, there is a large increase in volatility at the short interest rate on the day after the interest decision. Although the entire curve is impacted, the highest coe¢ cients are observed at the vertices of 30 to 180 days.
The Copom Minutes impact the middle of the curve with greater force. Until the date analyzed in this article, the communique of the decisions was concise and did not bring the projections of the Central Bank of Brazil on the in ‡ation for the next years. This information is contained in the Minutes of the meetings. The result found is consistent with the incorporation of these medium-term projections into the scenarios of interest-market participants.
The table 4 summarizes only the 14 coe¢ cients of the variables of interest obtained in the mean equation. The …rst four results refer to days in which the President was named in the Broadcast. The results indicate that, in these days, the variation of the interest is positive, and happens in greater magnitude in the long interest rates. In the opening of abstracts, it is observed that C2 is the periodical with the greatest impact. AB and C1 are less relevant, and only at the beginning of the curve.
< TABLE 4 -HERE>
The next set of regressions are for the four departmental directors. Except for the Director of Monetary Policy, days in which the other directors are mentioned in the reports present an increase in interest rates. While the Director of Dipec a¤ects the whole curve, the greatest impact is felt when the Director of Direx is quoted.
The last group, with six parameters, refers to days in which there was some publication on the Central Bank of Brazil website, publications whether signed or not. This impact is re ‡ected in the average interest rate changes. The President's studies are the ones that make the most impact, especially at the long end. Studies of Direx, contrary to its name in the media, are not signi…cant. Studies of the Director of Dipec are signi…cant at the beginning and middle of the curve, as well as Director of Dinor. As in the news, there was no signi…cance for the Dipom Director.
Already the volatility in the identi…ed days is greater for only some of the regressions made. The table 5 shows the estimated coe¢ cient of dummies in the variance equation.
< TABLE 5 -HERE>
Days in which the name of the President of Central Bank of Brazil is mentioned in the summary C1 show greater volatility at the beginning and middle of the curve. The middle of the curve undergoes increased volatility if its name appears on C2. There is no impact on swap volatility when the directors are quoted.
Considering the publications of the Central Bank of Brazil website, the …nal part of the curve has its volatility increased in days in which there are publicized studies, speeches or other publications attributed to the President of the institution.
There is some sign of increased volatility in the middle of the curve on days of Dipec Director publications. The only negative coe¢ cients found, and the only signi…cant ones for this director, are at the short end of the interest curve in days that the Monetary Policy Director publishes some study on the Central Bank of Brazil website. In these days, the volatility of short interest rates is reduced.
Rolling Regressions
While in the previous section the parameters were retrieved from the entire sample of 2.753 days, in this section were performed regressions with rolling window with a window of 1,000 days and graphs were constructed with the coe¢ cients of the variables of interest in the mean and variance equations. Together with the coe¢ cients, the 90% con…dence interval was also presented. All regressions have as the dependent variable the 360-days Pre-DI Swap.
As there are few comments about the Central Bank's directors, both media citations and signed studies, only the President's graphics in the media and publications on the Bacen website, signed or not by the President, will be covered in this section.
In the …gure 5, the dark line refers to the coe¢ cient of the variable of interest in the mean equation. The light line is the coe¢ cient of the variance equation. Note that the coe¢ cient of the mean equation is positive and signi…-cant throughout practically the entire sample, in the six regressions performed.
< FIGURE 5 -HERE>
Regarding the volatility coe¢ cient, it is interesting to note an increase in the sensitivity of interest rates to the media at the end of the sample (from the end of 2014 to the Opening, mid-2015 to Scenario 2 and later this year to Scenario 1) .
The same goes for the sensitivity of interest volatility to Central Bank's publications. The coe¢ cients of the total publications and those signed by the President become signi…cant in August 2014.
The results suggest an increase in interest rate sensitivity on days when the Central Bank provides new information, either through the media or through studies published on its website. This sensitivity has increased in recent periods.
If on the one hand this may point to a more transparent central bank, which signals its perceptions more to the market, on the other hand it can also mean that the communication is generating many noises in the market. The press release published by Bacen and already discussed in the section 3 meets this last hypothesis.
Intraday Regression
In the regressions of this subsection, the dummies of the variables of interest were changed to try to capture the speech of the President or Directors throughout the day.
The …rst variable of interest takes into account if the name of the President of Central Bank appeared only in the summary Opening. On this day, as there was no mention of the President for the remainder of the day, there was theoretically no information from the media that could alter the interest rate.
The second and third dummies created would show if there was information throughout the trading session. They assume value 1 if the President did not have his name mentioned in the Opening summary, but was mentioned in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 or only in Scenario 2. In the …rst case, it would mean that relevant information was released between 9am and 1pm, while in the second case the information would arise between 13h and 18h.
Finally, a dummy was built if the name of the President was mentioned in all three summaries, which would capture very relevant information disclosed to the market, but which may have occurred on the previous day or night.
The data extracted from the BM&FBovespa website ranged from May 2014 to July 2015, with a total of 927 observations (three per day: 9, 13 and 18 o'clock ), as already mentioned in subsection 4.2. The table 6 indicates the number of observations of the four dummies.
< TABLE 6 -HERE>
As found in subsection 6.1, the controls did not show large variations among the four regressions. Therefore, its analysis will be made in only one regression, in the case that includes as variable of interest the appearance of the President in the media in the three summary. The table 7 shows the results.
< TABLE 7 -HERE>
The surprises of in ‡ation and industrial production, and the control dummies of the day after the decision of interest rate and the day of the Minutes, assume value only at the time of 9 o'clock. It is assumed that the impact of this information is already included in the opening price of the trading ‡oor.
For the surprise in the IPCA, the result is not as homogeneous as the one presented in the daily regressions, with some vertices in the middle of the curve showing no sensitivity to the surprise. However, the middle of the curve is positively impacted. Already surprises in industrial production do not impact interest rate as it did before.
The controls present in the variance equation follow positive and signi…cant. Days after the Copom meeting show greater volatility, especially at the short end, while information from the Minutes a¤ects the longer curve more.
The following tables show the coe¢ cients of the variables of interest in the mean and variance equations, respectively: 8 and 9.
7
Except for a few vertices in the regressions that include dummies for days that the President appears only at the Opening, or only in Scenario 1 and 2 (these still with negative signs), it was not possible to capture intraday volatility increase with news published in the media.
< TABLE 8 -HERE> < TABLE 9 -HERE> Two justi…cations are possible for the result. First, an intraday interest rate curve was obtained by simple interpolation of DI futures contracts. Some of these vertices are lower, which may have a¤ected the result. The other explanation would be the short period of time for the time series available in the BM&FBovespa's website, only a little more than a year.
Concluding Remarks
Raising the central bank's powers to generate price stability has brought with it a consensus that transparency in its policies and thoughts is of crucial importance in achieving the objective.
The main transparency tool of central banks is their communication. Although central banks' main channel of communication occurs through o¢ cial technical publications, media interviews are needed to explain the institution's actions as well as dedicated investors, as well as towards the general public. This expansion of knowledge strengthens the transmission channels of monetary policy.
In this article, we found evidence that these two types of communication carried out by the Central Bank of Brazil, o¢ cial and by the media, in ‡uence the Brazilian interest curve. Days in which citations to the President of the institution in the media present greater volatility in relation to other days, especially considering the short end of the curve. The same situation occurs 7 There was no convergence in two regressions for the 30 days Pre-DI Swap.
when there is the publication of o¢ cial publications on the Bacen website which, in turn, a¤ect the long end of the curve more.
In the intertemporal analysis, there is an increase of interest sensitivity to the communication of Bacen in the most recent period. The results show that the Brazilian central bank is more "vocal" and has been increasing its transparency with investors, using as communication both its technical studies and the specialized media for this. 
